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Non-technical Summary
This paper discusses the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to
invest in innovative activities. Economic theory proposes different incentives in
owner-led firms and manager-controlled firms. In the first place, the impact of
risk on the incentive to invest in R&D are compared for the capital-led and the
managerial firm. On the one hand, the risk of dismissal for the manager implies
less innovative investment than in the “traditional“ capital-led firm. On the other
hand, innovative activity will most likely increase the growth rate and therefore
the size of a firm. This is a positive stimulus for R&D in the managerial firm.
We present empirical analyses on the determinants of the R&D intensity of
firms. We use a sample of 3,978 observations from the Mannheim Innovation
Panel. Aside of more conventional measures like competition, size and other
variables, we explain the R&D activities by the leadership and the ownership of
firms. On the one hand, we distinguish manager-led firms from owner-led firms.
On the other hand, we hypothesise that the R&D expenditures of manager-led
firms depend on the control exerted. We take that into account by a Herfindahl
index of capital dispersion.
We estimate Tobit models and it turns out that the management control has a
significant impact on the R&D intensity of firms. If the capital shares are widely
dispersed and the managers are thus not intensively controlled by the owners,
they invest more into R&D than others. In contrast, there is no significant differ-
ence in R&D intensities among owner-led firms and managers who are strongly
controlled.
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11 Introduction
The importance of technological progress for the wealth and long-term growth
of nations has been acknowledged by scholars from very different schools of
thought. In the 1970s and 1980s several studies reported the decline in pro-
ductivity growth (see, e.g. Dertouzos et al. 1989) and discussed the effect of
R&D in this context (see, e.g. Fagerberg 1987). Clearly, productivity growth is
the most important determinant of income improvement and thus the wealth
development of an economy.
There are interesting questions concerning the reduced growth rates: Are they
a result of less successful innovation policies in modern firms? At the same
time, the importance of large firms in contrast to small ones with respect to in-
novation is an important topic (Acs and Audretsch 1988, 1990). Evidence from
case or industry studies point to the view that large firms mainly pursue estab-
lished technological trajectories and that really revolutionary innovations come
from outside (Henderson 1993).
Since the beginning of the discussion on innovation, a major emphasis has
been given to the central role of the entrepreneur for this process. For example,
Kirzner (1985) in line with the view of Mises (1951) emphasizes that
a) the market is an entrepreneurial process,
b) a learning process is central to the market and
c) entrepreneurial activities are creative acts of discovery.
In stark contrast to these statements on the entrepreneurs, nowadays big firms
are led by managers which leads to a classical principal agent problem. Man-
agers are mainly paid on the basis of a fixed salary and it is rather questionable
whether they always act in the interest of the capital owners. According to
Mises (1951) an entrepreneur is defined by the following criterion: “There is a
simple rule of thumb to tell entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs. The entre-
preneurs are those on whom the incidence of losses on the capital employed
falls.” If this definition is used, the vast majority of the leading firms in all devel-
2oped capitalist countries are not led by entrepreneurs. It remains to be investi-
gated which consequences this has for the innovation process.
The topic is not really new. Kraft (1989) discusses this among other determi-
nants of innovative activity. It is empirically demonstrated that managerial firms
show less innovative activity than owner-led companies. However, Kraft (1989)
provides no deeper theoretical analysis concerning this result and has only a
very small sample for the empirical test. Recently, some theoretical contribu-
tions have elaborated on this issue. Holmström (1989) discusses the principal
agent problem in the context of innovation. Zwiebel (1995) uses a two-period
model with the expected remuneration of managers and considers the incen-
tives for innovation if a manager is dismissed, provided the performance is be-
low some level. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1997) apply an intertemporal
model to demonstrate that managers will invest less in innovation than others.
They assume that the managers have private costs connected with innovations
that determine their results. Schmidt (1997) examines the impact of product
market competition on managerial incentives within a static model with uncer-
tain profits. All papers assume risk-neutral agents, which can be criticized as a
very restrictive assumption in principal-agent situations like managerial remu-
neration.2
The incentives of managers and the optimal payment structure have been dis-
cussed in many articles. The present paper deals with the role of managerial
leadership of large firms in innovative activity in comparison to owner-led firms,
i.e. the “classical” entrepreneurial firm. Furthermore, we investigate the effect of
capital share dispersion: we consider the question whether close capital market
control has the same, a similar, or no impact on management behavior in com-
parison to owner-led firms. At first, the incentives for a managerial-led firm in
contrast to the entrepreneurial firm are discussed. This discussion demon-
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3strates that opposing effects are at work here. Subsequently, we present the
results of an empirical study concerning this question. We analyse whether the
leadership of firms (managers versus owners) and the dispersion of capital
shares have an effect on investment in R&D. For this purpose, we use data
collected by the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) of the Centre for European
Economic Research (ZEW). In total, we have information on 2,223 German
firms for the years from 1992 to 1996, which leads to 3,978 observations. We
have information on whether management has a significant share of the capital
and thus the firm is led by at least one of the owners. Additionally, we use the
capital share dispersion as a measure of capital market control. The MIP has
information on small and medium-sized firms, which are often controlled by a
single owner as well as on large firms with several owners. The dispersion of
the capital ownership is measured as a Herfindahl index which is added as an
explanatory variable to more conventional variables that explain innovation.
2 Theoretical Considerations
2.1 Risk
Investment in R&D is clearly a risky project. Actually, one of the most important
tasks when innovative activity is analyzed is the consideration of the effect of
risk. In the given context firm ownership has essentially two effects:
1. the attitude towards risk, in particular risk-aversion versus risk-neutrality and
2. the effect of uncertain returns on the expected income of a capital owner in
comparison to that of a manager.
The first aspect is of potential interest, but the effects are quite obvious and
need no further analysis.3 The second effect will be considered more in detail.
In most cases managers are paid on the basis of a fixed part and a profit-
related component. Of course the capital owner only receives profits. However,
in contrast to the owner, who cannot be dismissed, managers face the risk of
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4dismissal if the performance of the firm is below a certain level. As innovative
projects are necessarily risky and in most cases more risky than investment into
capacity enlargement, for example, managers have the specific risk of being
dismissed if a project fails completely. This is essentially the point of Zwiebel
(1995).
2.2 Firm Size
For some time now it has been discussed whether and, if so, why managerial
firms are size oriented.4 It seems to be an accepted “stylized fact” that manag-
ers’ salaries depend largely on firm size and only to a small degree on returns
on capital. For example, Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) cite evidence that
as a general rule the salary of top executives increases by 3% when the firm’s
sales increase by 10%. This will clearly lead to a growth orientation of manage-
rial firms. Non-monetary determinants of managers’ utility-like status, power
and prestige are most likely more closely related to firm size than to profitabil-
ity. Perhaps the capital market realizes the financial success, but the public
opinion is more impressed by employment figures and thus the personal influ-
ence increases with firm size.
The pursuit of increasing size as an aim in addition to, or at the expense of,
profit is at least a widely discussed hypothesis. If time enters the analysis, it is
natural that growth maximization is considered. Firm growth will, among other
things, be determined by innovation. New products in particular, but also supe-
rior new processes will lead to larger sales figures. Of course, not every inno-
vation project will lead to a success, but higher expenditures for R&D and more
projects will increase the probability of one or more successful results. Cer-
tainly, there are less risky ways to increase firm size, in particular mergers.
These are intensively investigated and their average negative impact for overall
profits is well established. Perhaps as a substitute for this now critically dis-
cussed strategy, managers pursue other ways to increase size. The public
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5usually views innovative activity positively and a higher rate will hardly be criti-
cized by anybody. Therefore, this might be a better strategy than mergers and
acquisition. However, we do not claim that R&D activities are the only alterna-
tive to mergers.
Risk aversion by managers and their growth orientation are opposing argu-
ments if the managers’ incentives are investigated. Risk will most likely reduce
the degree of R&D expenditures, but growth orientation and the positive valua-
tion of innovation in the public is a stimulus for it. The net effect seems to be
unclear a priori. In Appendix B we present a simple model for the opposing in-
centive effects for managers.
It is also necessary to mention that the effects discussed above can only be
realized if the top managers are not closely controlled. If a dominant share-
holder exists, for example an owner family that has a large capital share, in
most cases the behavior of the managers is closely investigated. With a wide
dispersion of the capital shares the managers have more freedom. For the sin-
gle capital share a change of the total return on capital does not have much
absolute effect. Additionally, in a modern stock company the management
control is quite difficult, perhaps impossible, for an individual shareholder. The
necessary information on exerting control is hardly available. For this reason
we check for the impact of capital share dispersion on the behavior of manage-
rial firms.
3 Empirical Study
Some theoretical articles deal with the impact of managerial leadership on in-
novation. However, there is very scant empirical evidence on this quite funda-
mental question, given the dominance of the large manager-led firms in all de-
veloped countries. The only empirical study that we are aware of is Kraft
(1989). Actually, Kraft finds a lower level of innovative activity for managerial
firms. His sample, however, only has 58 firms and is therefore quite small. Al-
though useful as a first indication, a broader and more representative study is
needed for an analysis of this question.
6The theory deals with the difference between classical entrepreneurial firms
and modern managerial firms. We have information on whether one or more
dominant firm owners exists and in addition, whether one or more of them are
also the top managers. Thus we intend to differentiate between the managerial
and the owner-led firm based on this information. The owner-led firm is pre-
sumably more in line with the classical entrepreneurial firm than the managerial
firm and we want to investigate the effect of this differentiation on R&D.
There is extensive literature on the control exerted by capital owners and the
behavior of the firms, in particular profitability and management compensation.5
We follow this literature in that we assume that a narrow control of the capital
owners reduces the discretionary power of the managers. An efficient control
leads to an efficient level of R&D and, perhaps more importantly, if the capital
owners have a close look at the development of the firm and the environmental
conditions, the asymmetric information problem is reduced or does not exist at
all. This means that the capital owners know whether a good or bad profit situa-
tion is due to managerial slack or caused by bad luck. If this is true, the manag-
ers must not fear being dismissed if the profits are below a certain level be-
cause it is recognized that this is not their personal fault. Our hypothesis is that
risk and size effects should have no effect or only a small effect if a dominant
capital owner exists.
The control exerted by the capital will be a positive function of the concentration
of the capital stock. If capital is widely dispersed, the returns from effective
control are small for the individual capitalist and will therefore hardly be exerted.
This is a classical public goods problem. In accordance with the literature on
capital control (applied to other problems than innovation) we use the disper-
sion of capital shares as the measure for control exerted from the capital own-
ers. We have quite detailed information on this and are able to calculate a Her-
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7findahl index on capital dispersion. This variable is used in connection with
more conventional ones to explain the R&D intensity in firms.
3.1 Data
This study uses data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) conducted by
the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the German
Federal Ministry for Education and Research (bmb+f). This survey was
launched in 1992 and collects information from about 2,500 firms of the manu-
facturing sector every year. It represents the German part of the Community
Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European Commission. Additionally, we used
some information given in the database of the “Verband der Vereine Creditre-
form” which represents the sampling frame for the MIP. We use data from the
years 1992 to 1996. However, the response rate to some questions is limited
and, overall, data concerning 2,223 innovating firms are used. The Mannheim
Innovation Panel defines innovators according to the Oslo-Manual's guidelines
(OECD 1997, p. 47):
"Technological product and process (TPP) innovations comprise implemented technologi-
cally new products and processes and significant technological improvements in products
and processes. A TPP innovation has been implemented if it has been introduced on the
market (product innovation) or used within a production process (process innovation).
TPP innovations involve a series of scientific, technological, organisational, financial and
commercial activities. The TPP innovating firm is one that has implemented technologi-
cally improved products or processes during the period under review."
It is important to note that we only use firms with limited liability and stock com-
panies because in Germany only firms with these legal forms are able to split
management and ownership. This yields an unbalanced panel of about 3,978
observations. We pool the data for our regression analyses because less than
3% of the firms participated in all observed years. More than 50% of firms were
observed only once (see Table 2 in the appendix A).
The study analyzes the activity of firms specified as the expenditures for R&D
divided by sales (multiplied by 100). This is a standard variable and it is named
R&D/SALES. For 3,018 observations R&D/SALES is greater than zero. The
other firms did not engage in R&D activities at all.
8The focus of our analysis is the impact of the structure of firms' ownership on
innovation activities. Therefore, we create a variable HERF which is a concen-
tration index of owners' shares. Actually, this is calculated like the Herfindahl
index. Thus, HERF takes values between zero and one. It is close to zero if a
firm has many owners who all hold a small share. However, if one owner holds
the whole capital, it takes the value one. Additionally, we create the dummy
variable OWN. This is one if a firm is owner-led, i.e. the manager(s) hold any
capital shares. OWN is zero otherwise. Finally, we consider the degree of man-
agement control by CONTROL=(1-OWN)*HERF. If a manager leads the firm
this variable takes the value of our capital dispersion index HERF and it is zero
otherwise. Using the variables OWN and CONTROL we can describe three
types of management: 1. An owner-led firm (OWN=1, CONTROL=0), 2. A
strongly controlled manager (OWN=0, CONTROL=1 or close to one), 3. A less
strongly controlled or even uncontrolled manager (OWN=0, CONTROL=0 or
close to 0).
Additionally, we use the following explanatory variables: The market share
(SHARE) is measured at the three-digit industry level.6 The share of sales ex-
ported (EXPORT) is measured on the individual firm level and describes the
participation to international competition. A related variable is the share of sales
of foreign firms compared to total shares of both foreign and domestic firms in
an industry, which is called IMPORT. This variable is expected to express the
competitive pressure from other countries and is, of course, quite important for
an open economy like Germany.7 The next variable is the concentration ratio
(CONC), which is defined as the Herfindahl index at the three-digit industry
level. It is the sum of squared market shares of the firms operating in the three-
digit industry (and then multiplied by 1,000). In addition we use the change of
the index from period to period (DCONC). We assume that the consideration of
international trade, the concentration index, the change of this index, and the
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9individual market share make it possible to identify the degree of competitive
pressure with which a firm is faced.
Firm size is specified by seven size classes for the number of employees.
These dummy variables control whether innovative activity varies with firm size.
This takes into account another classical hypothesis by Schumpeter, namely
that larger firms show more innovation activity. The size classes are expected
to check for possibly non-linear size effects in a more variable way than, for
example, employment and employment squared. However, the results are in-
sensitive to the particular size variable. It is possible that the younger firms are
also the more innovative ones, as the foundation of a firm usually goes hand in
hand with the introduction of one or more innovations. The established firms
are often reluctant to introduce “fundamental” innovations and these are
launched by newly founded companies. In order to account for the effect of the
age of a firm, we include the inverse of the age of a firm in question (1/AGE).
We use the inverse in order to account for a probable non-linear relationship
between age and innovative activities. The variable capital intensity (KAPIN) is
defined as tangible fixed assets per employee in millions DM and is included in
order to control for differing technologies as well as for barriers to entry.
The data cover firms that are located in both western and eastern Germany
(the former GDR). In the 1990s, eastern German firms received many tax in-
centives and direct subsidies from the government in order to support their de-
velopment. Hence, it is possible that eastern German firms behave differently
from western German ones. We include a dummy variable (EAST) that has unit
value for companies operating in eastern Germany. It is well known that techni-
cal opportunities differ considerably among industries. We include 13 two-digit
industry dummies in order to control for specific effects. Furthermore, four time
dummies indicate whether an observation is from 1993, 1994, 1995 or 1996.
The year 1992 is the basis in this case. Descriptive statistics of the variables
used can be found in the Appendix.
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Due to the censorship of the distribution of the dependent variable R&D/SALES
we estimate Tobit models. As is frequently the case in microeconomic data,
heteroscedasticity occurs. We computed LM-Tests as suggested in Greene
(1997, p. 969). Thus, we consider a Tobit model with groupwise heteroscedas-
ticity. The heteroscedasticity term contains industry and size dummies as well
as year dummies and our regional indicator EAST.
Initially, we use data of all firms. In order to test for the robustness of the re-
sults, we then consider only managerial firms. The results are shown in Table 1.
Both the owner-led firms and the management-led firms with large capital own-
ers have fewer expenditures for R&D than the other firms. The Herfindahl-index
for the capital share dispersion has no significant independent effect. These
results are somewhat surprising, as the growth effect dominates the risk aspect
that is perhaps unexpected. The results are just the opposite of what Zwiebel
(1995) and Aghion et al. (1997) suppose. We explain the difference by the
dominance of the firm size with respect to the growth argument for managerial
incentives. Zwiebel (1995) and Aghion et al. (1997) do not discuss this aspect.
On the one hand managers get “punished” for insufficient profits by a dismissal,
but on the other hand they get a “reward” for high growth rates via increased
salaries.
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Table 1: Determinants of R&D/SALES - Tobit regressions
Complete Sample Only manager-led firms
Tobit Tobit with
Heteroscedasticity
Tobit Tobit with
Heteroscedasticity
KAPINT .49
(.26)
.05
(.06)
-1.18
(-.48)
-.56
(-.62)
20-49 employees# -.17
(-.29)
2.49
(3.36)
*** -2.88
(-2.30)
1.50
(.63)
50-99 employees# -.55
(-.95)
2.65
(3.65)
*** -2.48
(-2.05)
2.88
(1.22)
100-199 employees# -1.37
(-2.28)
** 2.70
(3.79)
*** -3.63
(-3.10)
** 2.71
(1.16)
200-499 employees# -.58
(-.96)
3.02
(4.25)
*** -2.79
(-2.40)
2.98
(1.28)
500-999 employees# .013
(.02)
* 3.00
(4.15)
*** -2.20
(-1.84)
3.03
(1.30)
1000 and more
employees#
.96
(1.26)
3.54
(4.66)
*** -1.23
(-.99)
3.40
(1.45)
EXPORT .05
(7.57)
*** .02
(7.92)
*** .05
(5.97)
*** .02
(5.75)
***
SHARE .06
(1.27)
.05
(1.66)
* .06
(1.14)
.06
(1.85)
*
IMPORT  .14
(5.68)
*** .07
(5.27)
*** .15
(4.59)
*** .10
(5.54)
***
CONC -.01
(-1.33)
-.01
(-2.07)
** -.01
(-1.91)
* -.01
(-3.26)
***
DCONC .07
(2.63)
*** .04
(2.78)
*** .05
(1.46)
.05
(2.20)
**
1/AGE 1.39
(1.03)
-.04
(-.05)
5.57
(2.75)
*** .03
(.04)
EAST 3.61
(8.96)
*** 1.56
(6.80)
*** 2.82
(5.00)
*** 1.48
(5.68)
***
OWN -1.72
(-3.79)
*** -.41
(-2.30)
**
CONTROL -2.11
(-3.27)
*** -.70
(-2.41)
** -1.60
(-3.84)
*** -.43
(-2.70)
***
HERF .55
(1.13)
.18
(.78)
Constant -5.17
(-4.72)
*** -4.60
(-5.57)
*** -2.52
(-1.55)
-5.10
(-2.12)
**
Log Likelihood -11,262.92 -9,928.82 -6,364.38 -5,472.80
Number of observations 3,978 2,133
Share of censored obs. .32 .23
Notes: All estimations include 13 industry dummies and 4 time dummies. The results are not
reported. The heteroscedasticity was modeled groupwise (see Greene 1997, p. 967). The het-
eroscedasticity term contains size dummies, industry dummies, time dummies and EAST. The t-
values are given in parentheses.
*** (**, *) denotes a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
# The reference class consists of firms with 5 to 19 employees.
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A test of the hypothesis that the coefficients of the owner-led dummy OWN and
the interaction variable CONTROL are equal shows that these are not signifi-
cantly different. Hence, the delegation of tasks to managers instead of leader-
ship by the owners themselves has no effect on the R&D intensity if the man-
agers are closely controlled.
The evaluation of the result on R&D expenditures is most likely different from
the firm owner and the society’s point of view. We have no information on the
rentability of the R&D expenditures, but since the owner-led and the efficiently
controlled firms show fewer expenditures, we assume that the management
controlled firms have too much R&D if profit maximization is the aim. The capi-
tal owners will most likely disapprove of this apparent waste of resources. How-
ever, the individual evaluation must not be equivalent to the society’s total wel-
fare effect. Given the importance of spillovers from R&D expenditures to other
firms, positive external effects of innovative activity exist and then the firm’s in-
dividual incentives might be too low from the society’s viewpoint. Hence, the
larger expenditures of the managerial firms might be welfare superior. Given
that the literature discusses the problematic aspects of managerial leadership
more frequently, our result concerning R&D is perhaps one of the few instances
in which managerial firms have a positive aspect.
The other results are of interest as well. The control variables work quite well. A
strong effect comes from the share of exported sales. The import ratio also has
a strong positive impact on R&D activity. Apparently, these firms are forced to
be innovative in order to be successful in international competition. In line with
these results on international competition is the negative and significant coeffi-
cient of the concentration variable. However, in contrast, DCONC is significant
and positive, which points to another conclusion.
The time dummies 1994 and 1995 (which are not reported) are significant. Ad-
ditionally, we find strong differences between the individual industries, which
does not come as a surprise. Firm size also has an effect, but only the differ-
ences with respect to the smallest firm class are large. The size classes with
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200 to 499 employees and with 500 to 999 employees have about the same
coefficients, but otherwise expenditures for R&D divided by sales increase with
firm size.
4 Conclusion
We investigate the impact of the leadership of a firm on the incentives for inno-
vative activity. In the first place, the impact of risk on the incentive to invest in
R&D are compared for the capital-led and the managerial firm. On the one
hand, the risk of dismissal for the manager implies less innovative investment
than in the “traditional“ capital-led firm. On the other hand, innovative activity
will most likely increase the growth rate and therefore the size of a firm. This is
a positive stimulus for R&D in the managerial firm.
Furthermore, the results of an empirical study are reported. We compared
whether owner-led firms differ from managerial firms in general. Additionally, we
consider the impact of capital market control. Capital control is defined as the
dispersion of capital shares and is measured by use of a Herfindahl index. The
more dispersed capital ownership is, the more the firm invests in R&D. The
capital share concentration has about the same effect as if one or more of the
capital owners were also the top managers: They invest less in R&D. If profit
maximisation is concerned then it is not necessary to “make everything one-
self”, but a close control suffices. However, if R&D activities have large spill-
overs to other firms, it is questionable whether the private optimal expenditures
are also the socially desirable ones.
At first glance this result seems to be in contrast with case studies like
Henderson (1993) and with the a priori expectations of most economists.  Many
stories exist in which established firms rejected offers from inventors regarding
new products. The inventors frequently had to found a new enterprise them-
selves because otherwise the inventions would never be commercialized. The
recent attention that newly founded small enterprises have attracted in the pub-
lic and by the politicians in many countries is perhaps motivated by such cases.
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Apparently, our results contradict these case studies. However, this must not
necessarily be true. Perhaps managerial (uncontrolled) firms pursue the more
established and less risky projects with their R&D activities. It is possible that
really revolutionary (and very risky) innovations are not developed by the large
firms but come from the small capital-led ones. It is still a possibility that  large
managerial firms have incremental innovations, but not the really new inven-
tions. However, this is speculative and in order to say something about this
question, we need more detailed information on the innovative output.
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Appendix A
Table 2: Panel Structure
Observed Patterns
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Firms Percent Cum.
X 500 22.49 22.49
X 239 10.75 33.24
X 237 10.66 43.90
X 196 8.82 52.72
X X 146 6.57 59.29
X X X 90 4.05 63.34
X X 78 3.51 66.85
X X 69 3.10 69.95
X X X X X 67 3.01 72.96
Other Patterns 601 27.04 100.00
2,223 100.00
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
R&D/SALES 3.55 7.37 0 92.11
KAPINT .08 .08 .0018 .67
Employees/1000 .46 1.68 .005 40.98
EXPORT 21.06 23.31 0 100.00
SHARE .63 3.09 .00037 90.39
IMPORT 20.11 9.20 5.53 54.43
CONC 47.84 34.01 2.10 234.87
DCONC .37 5.02 -30.56 66.77
1/AGE .15 .15 .0042 1.00
EAST .36 .48 0 1.00
OWN .46 .50 0 1.00
CONTROL .39 .49 0 1.00
HERF .50 .50 0 1.00
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Appendix B
R&D and Growth in the Owner-Led Firm
In this section the level of innovative activity is derived on the basis of the fol-
lowing assumptions:
• Innovative activity is specified as expenditures for R&D and is called i.
• It is assumed that R&D expenditures improve the product quality and lead to
the introduction of new goods. We consider something like “standard sales
volume” S , which has the same value, if no innovation activities are pur-
sued. With positive R&D expenditures the expected growth rate µ  is also
positive and increases in i, however, at a decreasing rate.
• In addition it is assumed that risk also increases in R&D expenditures and
therefore the variance 2σ is a positive function of investment in R&D. These
assumptions lead to
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The term 2σ  stands for the expected variance of the expected growth rate µ  of
the firm. These specifications8 appear to be quite plausible concerning the ef-
fects of R&D projects. For example the assumptions can be motivated by the
intention of the firm to invest in projects with low risk in the first place, but with
larger investments more risky projects are also started. The decreasing returns
to innovative activity are standard and necessary to have equilibrium. In sum, it
also follows that if R&D expenditures are above some critical value, the stan-
dard deviation increases by a larger rate than the growth rate and hence
.0
2
<
∂
∂
i
σ
µ
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As usual, we assume a risk-neutral firm owner and the utility of this person de-
pends only on profits. The expected profit of the firm in this case is
( ) ( )( )
0
r s t
t
SV E S e ds i E i
r
µ
µ
∞
− − −

=  − = −
−
with the interest rate r . The interest rate might also reflect the risk of
bankruptcy if nothing or not enough is invested in R&D (a larger value of r
implies a higher risk of bankruptcy). We also assume 0r µ− >  in order that the
integral is bounded. Profit maximization by a risk-neutral firm owner at date 0
implies:
2
( ) 1 0
( )
E V SE
i r i
µ
µ
∂ ∂
= − =∂ − ∂
.
The decreasing returns to R&D with respect to growth guarantee that the
maximization problem is strictly concave in R&D investment and has an internal
solution.
R&D in the Managerial Firm
The managerial firm does not necessarily choose the same solution as the
owner-led firm. In order to interpret the behavior of the manager, the incentives
to managers must be considered. In Germany, managers are usually paid on
the basis of a large fixed component and a smaller flexible and profit-dependent
part.
Most empirical studies of managerial compensation schemes find that perform-
ance has a surprisingly small impact on remuneration. In an examination of US
companies, Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that a one dollar increase in the
total wealth of capital owners (stock value and dividend) leads to only a three
cent increase in management’s total compensation.
                                                                                                                               
8 In order to exclude uninteresting corner solutions it is also assumed that 
0
lim
→
∂
→ ∞
∂i i
µ
is true.
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In the first place, this dominant remuneration rule is applied to determine the
innovation strategy in this case and to compare it with the solution in the case
of unrestricted profit maximization without an explicit derivation of it. In the next
section the remuneration rule is endogenously determined.
The model is based on the Principal-Agent paradigm with moral hazard. There
are two economic actors: the informed party (Agent) whose information is rele-
vant for the common welfare and the uninformed party (Principal). The Principal
proposes a contract and the Agent accepts or rejects the offer.
B.1 Risk
Assumption: If the manager does not meet a certain performance level, she or
he is dismissed and incurs a utility loss9 (compare for a similar assumption
Schmidt 1997). This means that in the case of dismissal the manager must in-
cur search costs to find a new job. She or he may become unemployed for
some time and may have to move for an adequate position. These losses could
also reflect the loss in firm-specific human capital. Most important is probably
the loss in reputation, i.e. the dismissed manager has the stigma of being a
loser and of being rather incompetent. Their future income and also prestige
will generally be lower than it used to be.
Assumption: For simplicity, the value of income in the case of dismissal is ad-
justed to zero without any loss of generality (for a similar assumption, cf. Zwie-
bel 1995).
The required performance level is defined as a ratio ν  of the expected growth
rate µˆ . The expected growth rate as a function of R&D investment is assumed
to be public knowledge, as it may, for example, be based on forecasts by eco-
nomic research institutes, estimations by banks and investment institutes, on
                                           
9 Several studies besides Jensen and Murphy (1990) have examined the dependence of man-
agement compensation on performance [c.f. Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Main (1991), Kaplan
(1994a,b)] as well as ”punishment” in the case of management failure [Weisbach (1988); War-
ner, Watts and Wruck (1988); Gilson (1989); Fizel and Louie (1990)].
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announcements by competitors, or projections of the industry average. The
project-specific risk, however, is not known. If the firm in question has a growth
rate below ˆνµ , the manager is dismissed10. Hence, the manager must first take
into account the effects of R&D investment on expected growth and, second,
the impact on risk. The probability θ  of not meeting the given standard is de-
fined as ˆ( )θ µ < νµ , with the realized value µ  of the growth rate. The probability
of not reaching this level clearly depends on the standard deviation of the inno-
vation process. Assuming a normal distribution the ex ante probability of µνµ ˆ~ <
can be expressed as



 −Φ=

 −
σ
µνµ
σ
µνµθ ˆˆ
where Φ  stands for the cumulative distribution function.
B.2 Firm Size
There is extensive literature that discusses whether and why managers’ sala-
ries depend on firm size and not on profits alone (cf. the classical references
Marris 1964, Williamson 1964, Baumol 1962). Fershtman (1985), Fershtman
and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) have given an explanation for this phe-
nomenon. In oligopoly, it might be optimal to commit managers to follow appar-
ently non-profit maximizing behavior by relating salaries to firm size. The firm
will then grow and become a Stackelberg leader in an oligopolistic setting. The
incentives are a credible commitment to reach for size. If the other firm does
not follow such a strategy, the firm maximizing growth will realize larger profits.
If, however, the other firm follows the same strategy, both will have lower profits
and a classical prisoner’s dilemma emerges.
In oligopoly the owner-led firms have the same incentive to become the Stack-
elberg-leader as the manager-led firms. Hence, if managerial firms are com-
                                           
10 The hat stands for the expected value of growth and clearly 0 1ν< < . For example, it could be
50% but any value below one will have the same effect.
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pared with owner-led ones, there can only be a difference if the owner-led firms
are for some reason unable to commit to the output increasing strategy. This is
indeed a possibility, as a written contract is a credible commitment, which can-
not be replicated by an owner-led firm.
Rosen (1992) offers another explanation for the orientation of salaries at firm
size. The leader of a larger organization has a greater responsibility and if he or
she is successful, the marginal product will be higher than at the top of a
smaller company (Rosen 1992). Thus the mere observation of higher salaries
paid by larger firms says nothing about the incentive structure. Zábojník (1998)
explains sales maximization as a possibility to solve the problem of underin-
vestment into specific human capital.
There might as well be other reasons at work for the dependence of salaries on
sales. Sales are easy to implement as an aim, while profits can be measured in
many different ways. Accounting profits may have only a loose relation to eco-
nomically meaningful profit measures. Irrespective of being risk-neutral or risk-
averse, managers11 will dislike incentive schemes based on profit rates that are
not very reliable and subject to idiosyncratic and accidental fluctuations.
The simultaneous consideration of profit and sales orientation of the incentives
is included by adoption of the Fershtmen and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987)
remuneration scheme, (which is also suited for an analysis of managerial be-
havior outside of oligopolistic interdependence). In accordance with Fershtman
(1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) as well as Sklivas (1987) managers are
assumed to be risk-neutral here. The manager is paid at the margin in propor-
tion iα  to a linear combination of profits iπ and sales iS  :
(1 )i i i iO Sα π α= + −
                                           
11 Risk aversion is not considered by Fershtman (1985), Judd and Fershtman (1987) as well as
Sklivas (1987).
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The manager’s remuneration, however, will in general not be iO  but
( ) iE M F Oγ= + , with F  standing for the fixed component of remuneration and
γ  representing the share of profits and/or sales that goes to the managers.
Since the reward is linear in profits and sales and she or he is risk-neutral, the
manager acts to maximize iO  and the values of F  and γ  are irrelevant. In or-
der to adjust the Fershtman/Judd/Sklivas salaries rule to our dynamic innova-
tion problem the manager is paid on the basis of intertemporal profits and sales
volume.
In order to satisfy the participation constraint, the expected income has to be
greater or equal to the outside option u . The manager’s maximization problem
at date 0 is now:
(15)
( ) (1 ) (1 ) *0
(1 ) .
S SE M E i E F
r r
SE i F u
r
θ γ α α θ
µ µ
θ γ α
µ
      
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σ
−
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Maximization of this relation leads to:
(16)
2
( ) (1 )
( )
ˆ (1 )
( ) 0
ˆ (1 )
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The assumptions concerning R&D guarantee that the manager’s optimization
problem is globally concave and has a unique solution.12 The first term is only
identical to unrestricted profit maximization if 1α =  and 1γ = . There are two
opposing effects at work, namely size and risk: Given the growth orientation of
management, the marginal unit of R&D is only evaluated at the ratio 1α <  and
therefore the management invests more than the owner firm. The ratio 1γ <
does not play a role here. However, the second effect is that as long as the risk
of dismissal θ  increases with innovative activity, the manager will invest less in
R&D than the owner-led firm. In addition, the managers will invest more in less
risky projects in order to minimize their personal risk of being dismissed. Hence,
the manager-led firm is expected to invest more in conventional projects rather
than in really “revolutionary” products and processes. Casual evidence seems
to support the view that fundamental innovations are not developed by the large
manager-led firms, but by smaller owner-led ones. The large firms buy a license
or even a whole firm if an innovation turns out to be successful. It is unclear,
which one of the two opposing effects is the stronger one, and it remains a
question that can only be answered by use of an empirical study. In the ab-
sence of the threat of dismissal, the derivative
ˆ (1 )
ˆ (1 )
−∂ ∂ 
− ∂ ∂  

i
µ ν
θ σ
µ ν
σ
 = 0
and the optimization leads to larger R&D expenditures in comparison to the
owner-led firm.
                                           
12 Clearly R&D must be above the critical level necessary for a decreasing ratio of the growth
rate to the standard deviation, but this condition is obviously implied from the first order condi-
tion.
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